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ABSTRACT
An objective of thia paper ia to analyze the economic perforaance of

oo-itteeaJ in particular. the optimal degree of conaenaaa to be
required for co-ittee'a decision aaking (concerning acceptance or
rejection of projects). and the optiaal size of co-ittee.

Our focua is

on two baaic trade-offa in organizational decision aaking:

between the

(Type-I) errors of rejeotin1 100d projects and the (Type-II) errors of
acceptin1 bad projects; and between 1ain1

fro■

a

■ore

extensive

eTaluation of projects and the reaoarcea spent on eTaluation.

Ye provide

a general oharaoterization of the optlll1llll. and uae thia characterization
to derive a nuaber of qualitative results.

For instance, if the two types

of individuals' errors of judgaent are equal. then the aarginal aajority
rule is optiaal (that ia, for an increment in the co-ittee aize by 2. the
optiaal con1en1us increa1e1 by 1).

If. in addition. the 101101 from the

two types of errors are equal, then the aajority rule is optiaal.
The paper also analyzes hierarchies, polyarchiea, and aore complex
foras of organization. and derives, for inatanoe. simple interpretations
of the optiaal number of levels within a hierarchy. and unita within a
polyarchy.

Among other questions which we addreaa are, whether perfection

in organizational decision making is feasible, and whether it is
economically desirable.

ECONOMICS OF COMMITIBES
Raaj Kwaar Sah an.d Ioaeph E. Stiglitz

co-itteea represent a widespread fora of aodern decision aaking.
Thia ia becauae 'to err is kuaan':

on queations of iaportance. we are

often reluctant to delegate the deciaion aaking authority to an.y single
individual.

There is an iaplicit belief that the wiadoa of a committee is

greater than that of any aingle aeaber. that collective deoiaion aaking
avoids aoae of the worst errors that aight otherwise occur.

But there is

also a widespread belief that 'to consign a aatter to a co-ittee is to
consign it to death':
useful.
notions.

it la difficult to get co-ittoes to do anything

Thia paper is an atteapt to formalize aoae of these intuitive
We conatruct a aodel which enables •• to analyze the oon

aequencea for decision aaking of co-itteea of different aizea operating
11.Jlder different rules.

We show. for instance. that there is aoae truth in

the conventional w.isdom that while committees requiring a high degree of
consensus do avoid aany of the errors of accepting bad projects (or ideas,
or people) that an individual would have aade, they also reject

■ any

good

projects which an individual would not have rejected.
Economics is concerned with trade-offs, and the present paper is
concerned with the trade-off• involved in the decision aaking of
coJ11111ittees and other organizational forms.
which we focus:

There are two trade-offs upon

first. between the errors of rejecting good projects

(Type-I errors) and the errors of accepting bad projects (Type-II

2

errors); and, second, between the gains from a more extensive evaluation
of projects, and the extra resources spent on evaluating projects.

For

instance, by increasing the size of the consensus required for project
approval in a committee of a fixed size, one can decrease the Type-II
errors, but only at the expense of increasing Type-I errors.

Siailarly,

by increasing the size of the coamittee (and changing the decision rule in
an optimal way correspondi ng to the enlarged committee), one aay increase
the aean quality of projects adopted, but one also increases evaluation
costs.
We provide a characteriz ation of the optiaal rules for adoption of
projects, and of the optimal comaittee size. 1 As one would expect, the
optiaal decision rules depend on what kinds of errors individuals make in
their evaluation of projects, and on how good or bad is the project
portfolio from which they choose.

Thia characteriz ation enables us to

delineate intuitive conditions llllder which majority rule (as required by
aany committees) is optimal, and under which the optiaal decision rule
entails more (or leas) con1en1u1 than that in the

■ ajority

rule.

We show

how changes in exogenous variables affect the optimal decision rule.

For

instance, the greater the relative loss from Type-I errors, the lower the
optimal degree of consensus; and the greater the relative loss from
Type-II errors, the higher the optimal degree of consensus.
Another objective of this paper is to study certain aspects of
hierarchica l (centralized ) organizatio ns, in which a project is undertaken
only if it is approved by the many successive layers of the hierarchy;
and of polyarchica l (decentraliz ed) organizatio ns, in which any one of the
many units can undertake a project, independent ly of others.
paper, we have contrasted the performance of

a

(In our 1984

hierarchy consisting of two

3

levels with a polyarchy consistin g of two firms).
Clearly, there are some parallels between an
which unanimity is required, and an
n

n

n

meaber co11111ittee, in

level hierarchy ; and between an

aeaber co-ittee in which one individua l'• approval is sufficien t for

project adoption, and an

n

unit polyarchy .

But, •• we shall see, there

are also aoae important differenc es among these organizat ional forms;
particula rly concernin g the sequence of decision making, and the
correspon ding evaluatio n coats.

lfe provide here an analysis of the

optimal number of levels in a hierarchy , and the optimal nlllllber of units
in a polyarchy .

lfe then extend our analysis to

■ore

complex organizat ions

which are coaposed of hierarchi es, polyarchi es, and committee s.

Among the

questions we address are, whether perfectio n in organizat ional decision
aaking is feasible, and whether it is economic ally desirable .

The paper also provides an insight on why there is such a widesprea d
sense of powerless ness in modern societies , even among individua ls who
occupy seeaingly important decision

■&king

positions .

One interpret ation

of this phenomenon is that an individua l feels powerless if the collectiv e
decision is contrary to his judgment; for example if a project is
accepted (rejected ) when this individua l disapprov es (approves ) of the
project.

The theory which we present suggests that when decision making

is well organized , the nature of h1111an fallibili ty is recognize d and,
thus, this form of powerless ness is an essential counterpa rt of economic
decision

■ aking.

This paper is not closely related to the standard literatur e on voting
rules in the theory of social choice.

There, the emphasis has been on

identifyin g rules to 'aggregat e' different preferenc es of individua ls,
which satisfy certain desideratu m.

Here, values (objectiv es) of the
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members of the organization are the saae, but their judgments differ

(possibly because of the incompleteness and the differences in
information).

Though, in an abstract sense, these differences in

judgments can be represented as differences in preferences, the particular
structures of organizations within which we study the problem of decision
••king allow us to obtain aany qualitative insights.
It appears to us that the situations which we describe here, where the
central differences among individuals are in their judgments, not in their
T&lues, arise frequently in economic contexts.

Even in political

contexts, such as national elections, the extent to which collective
choices are aade on the basis of judgments (concerning the competence of
candidates) rather than on values seems, at best, a aoot question.
The paper is organized as follows.

The basic aodel for analyzing the

central trade-offs is presented in section I.

We use this model, in

sections II and III, to characterize and interpret the optimal decision
rules for committees' project acceptance, and the optimal committee size.
Section IV contains an analysis of decision making in hierarchies,
polyarchies, and more complex fora1 of organizations.

Concluding remarks

are presented at the end.

I.

There are

n

reject projects.

THE MOOEL

members in a committee, whose task is to accept or
The size of (minimum required) consensus for accepting a

project is represented by

k.

That is, a project is accepted only if

or more members accept it; otherwise it is rejected.
n

> 1.

n

2

k

2

0,

and

There are two kinds of projects, good and bad, with respective

k

s
(net expected) profits
a

and

where

is the proportion of good projects:

are positive.

and

1) a)

0. 2

An individual has

aoae, but not perfect, ability to distinguish between good and bad

projects.

Thus, if

p

and

1

p

2

represents, respectively , the probabili

ties that an individual committee aellber accepts a good and a bad project,
One can interpret

1 - p

and

1

as the Type-I

and Type-II errors entailed in an individual' • decision aaking.

As we

shall aee, thia interpretati on ia highly useful in understandin g our
results.
We aas11111e at present that all coamittee aellbers are hoaogeneous in
their decision making abilities, and they judge a project si1mltaneou sly
(thus, the committee is not composed of aubcomitte es).

Later, we examine

certain decision structures in which the evaluation of projects is
sequential.

The probability that a project of type

i

is accepted by the

committee is

where

i = 1

and 2, and

1 - h

1

and

can be interpreted as the

Type-I and Type-II errors entailed in a co11J11.ittee's decision making.
Three intuitive properties of the above expression which we shall use
later are as follows.

First, a committee of a given size is leas likely

to accept a project (good or bad) if it requires

a

larger consensus.

can be aeen directly from (1) which yields

Thus,

h

is decreasing in

k.

Second, for

a

given consensus

This

6

require ■ent.

a larger co-ittee is

■ore

likely to accept a project.

Specificall y.

(3)

h(k. n + 1) - h(k. n) = (k

which shows that

h

~

is increasing in

)pk(1 - p)n-k+l
1

>O

•

n. 3

Both of these properties have siaple interpretat ions.

A larger

required consensus or a saaller coamittee size iaplies that every project

la being subjected to a tighter scrutiny; as a result. the probability
that a project is accepted by the committee is lower.
for good as well as bad projects. it has u

Since this is true

i-ediate implication :

A

larger required consensus or a smaller committee size leads to a greater
incidence of Type-I errors and a smaller incidence of Type-II errors in
co-ittee's decisions.
A third. obvious. property of expression (1) h

that a project is

■ore

likely to be accepted by a co-ittee if the probability of its acceptance
by individuals is higher.

(4)

ah/ap

That is 4

> o.

The (expected) profit of

where
single project.

a

co-ittee is given by

C(n)

is the evaluation cost for a

C depends on the size of the committee.

increasing and convex in

n.

n •

and it is

In (5) and in the rest of the paper. we

suppress the number of projects in the project portfolio faced by the
committee.
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II.

DECISION RULES FOR COJOlllTEES OF FIXED SIZE

Recall that a larger oonsensus requireaent has the advantaae that
fewer bad projects are aooepted, but also the disadvantage that a larger
number of good projects are rejected.

Therefore, as one would expect, the

optimal decision rule (oonsensus) depends on how good, or bad, the project
portfolio ia, and what is the nature of individuals' errors.

Our

objective in this section ia to identify some of the properties of the
optiaal 4eoiaion rule.

In particular. we delineate sufficient conditions

under which the aajority rule is optimal, and llll.der which the optimal
decision rule entails a larger, or a aaaller, oonaensus than that in the
aajority rule.

Also, we ascertain the effects of exogenous parueters on

the optiaal oonsensus.
A.

Optiaum

!. co-ittee'.1. profit is single peaked

In Appendix I(a). we show that:
in

k •

ud that the optiaal

k

is characterized by the e.z:pressions

(6a)-(6c) where, for brevity, we have used the notations:
and

2

,

r • (1 - p1 )/(1 - P > •
2
n

2 a 2 /a1 ,

(6b)

if

r

(6b)

if

a /a 2 rq
2 1

(6c)

q • Pi'P

n-k k
q

n-1

,

and

n-k+1 k-1
a /a 2 r
q
, with at least one strict
2 1
inequality, for an interior opti11Um.

r

l

It is apparent that (6a) states the condition for a corner optim under
which no scrutiny of projects is desirable.

Expression (6b), on the other

hand, provides the condition under which the opposite extreme, entailing

a

8

full 11.Jlanimity, is desirable.

In between these two

optillWD is characterized by the expression (6c).

extre ■es,

the interior

A aanipulation of (6c)

yields the following results [see Appe•dix I(b) for derivationa]. 5
PllOPOSITION 1 :

(7a)

:t

< ;:n

(7b)

:t

> l!.2 •

(7c)

aajority rule, if

+1 •
if

if

al

> 42

•

al

< a2

•

and

a1 •

and

P2 i 1 - Pl

P2 2. 1 - Pl

"2 •

and

P2 = 1 - pl•

Expressions (7a) and (7b). respectively, delineate sufficient conditions
under which the optblal consensus is saaller than. and larger than, that
in the aajority rule.

Expression (7c) is simply the special case of (7a)

and (7b). under which the aajority rule is optimal.
To understand these results. recall that a larger :t

lowers the

proportion of projects (good or bad) accepted by the committee.

Thia is

desirable if the project portfolio is relatively bad. but it is
undesirable if the portfolio is relatively good.

The quality of the

project portfolio ia captured in our

■ agnitude

relative to

a

2

•

Thia relative

■odel

■ aanitude

by the

of

a
1

represents how large is the

proportion of good projects, and how large ia the gain

fro■

a good project

compared to the loss from a bad project.
The implications of the portfolio quality are aeon clearly at the
extremes.

If the portfolio is extremely good, that is, if

negligible compared to

a

1

,

k = 0.

extreme, if the project portfolio ia extremely bad, that is,
a

2

•

2

is

then any scrutiny is entirely undesirable,

and the committee's profit is maximized by setting

negligible compared to

a

At the other
is

then the maximum possible scrutiny is

9

desirable. and the profit is maximized by setting

k = n.

These two

conclusions, in fact, can be observed directly from (6a) and (6b).
The aspect of individual's decision aaking capability which is central
to our analysis is whether they are

■ore

likely (or less likely) to reject.

a good project than to accept a bad project.

Type-I error.
p

2

•

1 - p

1

•

That is. whether their

is larger (or smaller) than their Type-II error.

It is not surprising, thus. that the results (7a)-(7c) are dependent

critically on the relative magnitude of these two types of errors.
Once again. extreme cases are illustrative.

For instance. if

individ•als' Type-II errors are relatively negligible. that is.
1 - P1
one.

> p2

➔

0 •

then it is never desirable to have

k

larger than

This is because, if individuals reject all bad projects. then more

than one screening of projects can only reduce the number of good projects
accepted. which would reduce co1111ittee's profit.
Type-I errors are negligible, that is,
profit is aaximized by setting
reject

p

k • n.

2

>1

In contrast. if the

- p

1

➔

0 •

then the

In this case, individuals do not

any good project; additional scrutiny, therefore, can only

improve the co-ittee's profit because fewer bad projects would then be
accepted.
When the effects of the portfolio quality and that of the individual's
errors are combined together, then (7c) can be viewed as a benchmark
condition for majority rule to be optimal.
of project portfolio is intermediate
of individuals' errors are equal.
(7b) are easily understood.

(a

1

Thia happens when the quality
= a ) •

and the two types

2

With this benchmark result (7a) and

If the project portfolio is better (worse),

and an individual is more (less) likely to reject

a

good project than to

accept a bad project, then the scrutiny should be slacker (tighter) than
the majority rule.
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B.

Comparative Statics

In the above model. the optimal consensus depends on the paraaeters
(n. a • a • p • p ) •
2
1
1
2

For a comparative statics analysis with respect to

these paraaeters, we focus on an interior optimum. treat

k

and

n

as

continuous variables, and employ the standard normal approximation to the
binomial distribution entailed in (1).
(8)

h

where

f

i

• 1 - f(z)
i

is the unit normal distribution function, and

z 1 • (k - npi)/[npi(l - pi)]
k

and

That is

n

1/2

•

The derivatives of (8) with respect to

are 6

(9)

(10)

Expressions (9) and (10) are the continuous. and approximated. versions of
(2) and (3) respectively.
what we would expect.

If e

Their respective signs are identical. which is

Fro■

(5) • the

opti■llll

is characterized by

represents an exogenous parameter, then a perturbation in

(11) yields

(12)

evaluated at the optillllllll, using (9) and (11), is 7
(13)

11

where

b = k(l - p

1

- p ) + np p • b
2
1 2

can be reexpress ed as

k(l - p )(1 - p ) + (n - k)p p , which is positive.
1
2
1 2
(13), it is obvious that Yll < 0.
Effect of Collllllittee Size:

We firat evaluate

Y
0

Thus, from (9) and

at the optimun, and

substitut e the resulting expressio n, 8 along with (13), into (12).

This

yields

Now, note that the n1111erator in the above right hand side equals
and, therefore ,
That is:

!

larger collllllittee has A larger optiaal consensus .

This aakes

intuitive sense since, if the size of consensus is left unchanged but the
oomaittee size is increased , then clearly the scrutiny becomes slacker
than before.

approved.

Jlore projects -

including aore bad projects -

get

To restore the desired tightness in screening , then, it is

reasonabl e that the required consensus should be increased .
Another bound on

dk
dn

is obtained by noting from (14) that:

dk
l - dn • [k(2n - k)(l - p )(1 - p ) + (n - k) 2p p ]/2nb) 0. Thus: The
1
2
1 2
optimal consensus increases less than the increase in the committee size.
The reason for this is parallel to the arg1111ent used earlier.
that

k

is increased by the sue nllJllber that

n

did.

rejected if the same number of individua ls disapprov e.

Assume

A project is now
But since there

are more individua ls in the coJ11J11ittee, it is easier for this to happen:
the scrutiny has become unambiguo usly tighter.
thus is to have a lower degree of scrutiny.
less than the increase in

The appropria te response

Therefore

k

increases by

n.

To understan d the role of individua ls' errors in the present conte%t,

12

dk
1
dn - 2 • k(k - n)(l - pl - p )/2nb ~ 0 • if
2
dk
1
dn =
2 . in the special case when p2 • 1 - p 1 •
This case could be called the aarginal aajority rule since the increase in
we use (14) to obtain:

the optimal consensus is one-half of the increase in the co-ittee size.
Therefore:

(i)

The aarginal aajority

n.a !I. optiaal

if the two .llP.!.!. of

individuals' errors All equal. and (ii) Tho increase J.!l the optimal
consensus in response to.!!! increased comittee size is greater (smaller)
than that !!! the aardnal aajority ml.!. .il b.diyiduah are leu

(.!!2..[!)

likely to reject.! good project than to accept A bad project.
These results are parallel to those in (7a)-(7c). and can be
understood in a siailar aanner. keeping in aind ono critical difference.
Those results (7a)-(7c) are global. but they hold only when the quality of
tho portfolio satisfies certain conditions.

In contrast. the present

results hold only in the neighborhood of an. interior opti111111l. but they do
not depend on the quality of the project portfolio.
Next. we note a simple result on tho effect of committee size on the
optimal consensus as a proportion of the committee size.

Consider the

case where the two types of errors are equal. that is. p = 1 - p •
2
1
dk
1
Then. from above. -=are treated as continuous
dn
2 • Also. when
variables. then (7a) and (7b) are equivalent to
(15)

Thus.

! s½•

if

~!) = (:: -

al~ a2 •

!fn ~

O •

(7a) and (7b) it follows that:

if

Combining this result with

When the two !.l'R.!.! of individuals' errors

.!!'..! equal, the optimal decision rule becomes closer to tho majority rule
.!.!. the size of committee increases.

the following proposition.

Tho above results are summarized in

13

PROPOSITION 2:

(16a)

(16b)
aargin al aajori ty rule. if p

2

= 1 - P
1

(16c)

Effec t of Portfo lio Qualit y:
aaalle r

A larger

a•

a larger

z

1

•

or a

implie s that the portfo lio faced by the co-it tee is better .

Furth er, froa (11),

8Yk/3a

< 0,

Using (12) and recall ing that

Yll

8Yk/az

<0

•

1

<0

•

and

3Yk/az

2 ) 0.

theref ore. the effect of port

folio qualit y is iamed iately ascert ained.
PROPOSITION 3:

The optima l she of consen sus !!. smalle r if.! commi ttee

faces. !. better portfo lio.
This result is clearl y in agreea ent with what we would have e%pec
ted
baaed on our earlie r discus sion.
Effect of Manag erial Qualit y:

An improvement in the indivi duals'

decisi on aaking abilit ies is repres ented in our model by a larger
a aaalle r

p

2

•

p

1

This. from (4). implie s that a commi ttee accept s aore

good projec ts. and reject s

■ore

bad projec ts.

The impact of an improv e

aent in the aanag erial qualit y on the optima l consen sus. howev
er, is
ambiguous in genera l; under some circum stance s. it may be desira
ble to
reduce

k,

10

that a yet larger propo rtion of good projec ts can be

accept ed; wherea s in other circum stance s, it aay be better to
increa se
k •

and

so that the accept ance of bad projec ts is lowere d even furthe r.

14

To aee this. oonaider the special case in which the two types of
p

individual errors are equal; that la.

2

= 1 - p

1

p

A higher

•

1

now

represents not only a lower Type-I error but also a lower Type-II error.
In this oaae. it can be ascertained

! S½. ° Co■binina
1

fro■

(11) that

~

0.

if

the last expression with (12) and (15). we obtain

jL} 0
•
4p ~
1

(17)

Thia result has an interesting iapUcation.
la relatively bad (that la
ia desirable.

a

1

< a2

).

accepted.

> a2

)•

On

If the project portfolio

then we know that a larger consensus
i■provea

Now. if the aanagerial quality

(17). the scrutiny should be slackened

a1

ayk/ap1

10

that

■ore

then,according to

good projects can be

the other hand. if the portfolio la relatively good (that ia.

and if the ••••aerial quality

i■provea.

then the scrutiny

should be tightened. so that a larger n1llllber of bad projects can be
rejected.

Thus:

fun

optiaal decision rule

the two .tnll. !!f lndiyiduala' error• are equal. the
oloaer

beco■ea

aanagerial quality iaproyes.

III.

n

the

■aiorlty

rule ll the

11

THE OPTIMAL SIZE OF A C<IIMITI'EE

In this section. we briefly consider tho ainltaneoua determination of
the optimal committee size and the optiaal size of consonsus required to
accept projects; in particular. we look at the impact of the evaluation
coat on the optimal

k

and

n.

For this. once again, we adopt the

approximation (8), and focus on an interior
characterized by (11), and by

(k. n) •

Thia is

15

which ia the first order condition of optiaality with respect to
Let

e

denote a paraaeter of the evaluation coat. auch that a

larger

e

ia

> 0.

Cne

optiaal

iapliea a larger aarginal coat of co-ittee aeabera; that

k

Then. it is obvious fro• our earlier analysis that the

is affected by

A.Adn

i s.

de

<0

Ynn

n.

dn de•

e

only through the change in

n;

that

Also. using the envelope theor••• and aasuaing that

~ < 0. There-

at the optilll1LID, a perturbation in (18) yields

fore. the results obtained in Proposition 2 oan be translated i-ediately
to ascertain the effect of evaluation coat on the optimal conaenaua. when
the co-ittee size ia optiaal.

~ •

For instance. 11Ultiplying (16a) by

we obtain the following proposition.

PROPOSITION 4:

! larger aardnal coat of committee aembera leads .12

1aaller oo-ittee size

.u. l!!1.!. .u. to

.! 1aaller size of oonsenaua.

.!

But.

the foraer decline ia larger than the latter decline.

IV.

A.

HIERARCHIES. POLYAR.CHIES. AND COMPLEX ORGANIZATIONS

Hierarchies

In aany organization,. decisions are aade sequentially.

bureaucracy conaiating of

n

Consider a

bureaus. in which a higher bureau

(individual) ezaainea only those projects which have been approved by the
bureau below it. and only those projects are finally accepted by the
organization which are approved by the highest bureau.

This bureaucracy

has aoae similarity to a co111111ittoe in which unanimity ia required;

specifically. tho probability of projects' acceptance by
be obtained by substituting

k = n

a

hierarchy can

into (1), which yields

A key difference between the two organizational forms, however, is
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that in the present case the nllllber of evaluations that a project goes
through depends not only on

n

(aa it does in a committee) but also on

bureaus' probabilities of acceptance of different projects.

This is

because larger acceptance probabilities i11ply that all bureaus (except the
one which is lowest) au1t evaluate a larger number of projects.
thia, note that if

p

To see

is the probability that a project is accepted by a

bureau, then the expected nuaber of evaluations for a project is:
1 + p + ••• + p

n-1

n

• (1 - p )/(1 - p) •

If one evaluation coats

c,

then the expected evaluation coat per project is

(19)

ac > 0

It is then easily verified that

api

• 12

Also, as one would expect,

the evaluation coat i i larger in a larger hierarchy; that ii,
Substitution of (19), and of
■axi■ ization

(20)

yB

(21)

P=

In (20),

h(pi) • p:,

of expected profit i i equivalent to

-= P~ -

(1 -

PP; ,
a)

:~

>0

•

into (5) shows that the
■uiaizing

where

f2 -1-\;}a~l + 1-\;) •

P can be viewed as a

llLlllll&ry

parameter representing the

'effective' portfolio quality; it is the relative loss in accepting a
bad project (when the gain from accepting a good project ia 1), taking
into account the coat of evaluating good and bad projects.

A smaller

p.

thus, denotes a higher effective quality of the portfolio.
A meaningful trade-off between the Type-I and Type-II errors requires
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that

p > 0;

otherwise all projects would be accepted by setting

n • 0.

From (21),

expected

1011

p ia positive if

z

2

> z 2 p2

+ c;

that ia, if the

(including tho oTaluation cost) from evaluating a bad

project for tho first tiae is saallor than tho
project is accepted without OTaluation.

if tho aaae bad

1011

Tho evaluation of projects is

clearly 1UU1eceasary if this condition ia not aet.
Treating

n

aa a continuous variable, tho first order condition of

optiaality of (20). with respect to

n.

yields the following expression

for the optimal nuaber of levels in a hierarchy. 13

(22)

B
n. -

ln(Plap /lnp )
2
1
ln(p1/p2)

B

and~;

Our interpretation of tho paraaeter

>O.

p suggests that the effective

quality of the portfolio should be higher if the actual quality of the
portfolio ia higher.

ll<o
aa
• !L<o
az
•
1

Thia ia verified directly from (21), which yields:
and !.L
~
vz
2

> 0.

Also,

ll
ac < o

•

Using (22), there-

fore, we obtain the following, easily understandable, results.

PROPOSITION 5:

!

better project portfolio, .2!'. .!. higher evaluation cost,

implies.!. smaller number of levels in.!. hierarchy.
The quality of managerial decision making (represented by
a

pi'•)

has

direct effect on the selection of projects, and also an indirect effect

on the evaluation costs.

The corresponding implications on

separated, respectively, as

(23)

n

H

can be
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The evaluati on of the indirec t effect is straight forward .
earlier. a larger

pi

As reaarked

aeans a larger evaluati on cost which. in turn.

lowers the optiaal nUJllber of leTels in a hierarch y. 14
The direct effect (through the selectio n of projects ) is. however.
ambiguous in general ; in soae ca•••• iaproved aanager ial quality (that
is. a larger

p

1

or a saaller

ca1e1 it aay raise

n

B

•

p )
2

aay lower

nB •

while in other

This aabiguit y is paralle l to the one which was

observed concerni ng the effect of aanager ial quality on the decision rules
for a co-itte e.

Sufficie nt conditio ns can be obtained . however . under

which the effect of

on

B

n

is predicta ble.

ascertai ned [see Appendix (c)] that:

if

~

> 1.

That is:

For instance . it can be

H

an > 0

if

ipl

and

The direct effect of a higher Type-I (Type-II )

aanager ial error ii to lower (raise) the optiaal nuaber Of leTeh in a

hierarch y. if the effectiv e quality of the portfoli o is high (low).
B.

Polyarc hies

The hierarch ical decision structur e examined above requires coaplete
1Ulaniai ty.

At the opposite extreae are polyarc hical decision systems in

which no con1en1u1 is required .

Such decision aaking mechanisms are

stylisti cally paralle l to those decentra lized institut ions in which
individu al units aake their decision s indepen dentlyi a project is
undertak en if any one of the units accepts it.

The project acceptan ce, in

this case, is similar to that in a committe e in which adoption of a
project requires only one aember's approva l.
units in a polyarch y, then substitu tion of

If
k

a

1

n

is the nuaber of
into (1) yields

The particu lar flow of projects on which we focus here is the one in
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which a project arrives randomly at one of the units which evaluates the
project.

The project is evaluated by another u.nit only if the first unit

rejects the project; this chain of evaluation continues until the
project is accepted by any one of the units, or 11.Jltil it is rejected by
all UJ1ita.

The sue project, however, is not evaluated aore than once by

any one u.nit.

1 + (1 -

p)

The expected number of evaluations for a project then is:

+ ••• + (1 - p)

n-1

•

[1

C(n, p , p ) • ca[l - (1 - p )n]/p + c(l - a)[l - (1 - p )n]/p •
1
1
2
1
2
2
contrast to (19), the evaluation coat in this case is lower if p
1
p

are higher.

2

In
and

This is intuitive because if one unit accepts aore

projects, then other u.nit1 evaluate fewer projects.
Substituting the above coat fll.Jlction, and
into (5), it follows that the expected profit aaximization is equivalent
to

■ axiaizing

(24)

where

(25)

p 1UUDarizea the effective portfolio quality, taking into

Once again,

p is the relative gain in

account the evaluation coat; but now

rejecting a bad project, when the 1011 in rejecting a good project is 1.

p implies a higher effective quality of the portfolio.

A smaller

Parallel to (22), we obtain the optimal number of units in a polyarchy as

(26)

n

p

ln[Pln(l - p )/ln(l - p )l
=

2

ln(l - p )/ln(l - p )
1
2

1

• and
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The analysis of the above e:xpression is quite similar to that of (22);
we therefore leave out the details. and S'Ullllarize the results.
PROPOSITION 6:

A better portfolio,~ A

.!. larger p11aber of

Jmlli. in

f ■ aller

eyalpation .29.1.1. implies

.1. polyarohy.

Alao. given the aymaetry between (22) and (26), it ia obvious that the
(direct and indirect) effects of pi
.

t hoae on

n

H

•

p

on n

Specifically, a larger p

1

are precisely opposite to
reduces the evaluation coat

and. thus, raises the optiaal nuaber of units in a polyarchy.
p

aan < 0
pl

Also.

. p

if

~ < 1 • and :n < 0 if ~ > 1. These sufficient condi
P2

tiona can be interpreted in a aanner similar to that outlined earlier.
An analogy to the proble• of resource extraction:

An interesting. and

useful. interpretation of the above analysis la aa follows.

If the aet of

100d projects in the portfolio la viewed aa the valuable resource then.
for any organization. there are three coats of extracting this resource:
(i) evaluation coats. (ii) the loaa due to inadvertent acceptance of bad
projects. and (iii) the coat due to lost opportunities if some part of the
portfolio (containing some good projects) is no longer available for
evaluation.

With this interpretation. it ia clear that hierarchies

increase the proportion of good to bad projects at successively higher
levels but, in the same process, they deplete the stock of projects
available for consideration.

Polyarchies. in contrast. are better at

preserving the portfolio of projects but they entail a higher loss due to
the acceptance of bad projects.
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C.

Coaplex organizations

An implication of the above analogy ia that a combination of hierarch

ical and polyarchioal features aight perform better under certain
oircua1tanoe1.

Aa an illustration, consider a hierarchy consisting of

n

levels, and compare ita performance to a polyarchy oon1i1ting of two
A
2

hierarchies, each of which haa

Denote the variables

levels.

corresponding to these two organizations by 1uper1cript1 1 and 2
respectively.

Clearly,

h1 • pn,

and

h2 • 1 - (1 - pn/ 2 ) 2 •

evaluation coats depend only on the number of

D./2
where. ti •p
•
i
and

1

even if
Thus:

> tl

Now, if n

i i large, then

+ t2 •

Thus, if

Cll l Cl2 ,

a1<a2,

provided

Cll

then

ia not too

If the evaluation .2R.!..t.l depend only

if the portfolio quality

■ anagera,

~

tl

and

r>r.
a ■all

If the

then

are small,

t2
The

compared to

the number of

aa■e

i i true

Cl2 •

■ anagera,

and

!l. not too .l!?x, then it ii profitable to

reorganize.! large hierarchy into two hierarchical aubunita within.!
polyarchy. 15
The above example of a aixed organizational fora 1ugge1t1 two
iaportant questions:

first, ia it possible to de1i1n complex organiza

tions (that ia, a combination of coamittees, hierarchies and polyarchiea;
polyarchies; where each subunit is itself a coJDJD.ittee, hierarchy or
polyarchy; and

10

on) which attain perfect screening; and, second, are

such organizations economically desirable?

The answer to the first

question is not only yes but, in fact, there are several alternative
arrangements which, with sufficiently large number of screens, yield
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perfect screening.

The following two propositions describe two

alternative ways [see Appendi% I(d) for detailaJ.
PltOPOSITION, 7:

An

( ■•

16

polyarchy-hierarchy ( that ll• ,m a-miit

n)

polyarchy where each .u!1 !.!. ,m n-!ll.!,1 hierarchy) in which each l!.n.l of
hierarchy i• itself .m

( ■•

n)

polyarchy-hierarchy will. with sufficient

iteration•• ili,li perfect screening.
PltOPOSITION 8:

A (k. n)

co-ittee (that ia, A committee consisting R!

n

1pbcomitteu. which adopts A project ll it ll. approved lu: .!1 hut

k

subco-itteea) in which ll£h aubco-ittee itself is A

oomittee yill.

(k. n)

n!h sufficient iterations, yield perfect screening.

The intuition underlying the above result• is simple.

A polyarchy

consisting of units which are themselves hierarchies can be designed, by
choosing appropriately the allllber of units in the polyarchy and the n1llllber
of levels in the hierarchy. such that it has better screening ability
(that is, it aakes lower Type-I a• well as Type-II errors) than an
illdividual.

Thia is because each of the hierarchies iaprove the ratio of

good to bad projects. while the polyarchical structure allows a better
preaenation of the portfolio.

E%tending this logic. then. the screening

ability can be further improved by treating the above polyarchy-hierarchy
•• a tingle subunit. and by constructillg another hierarchy-polyarchy
consisting of such subunits.
li■ it.

perfect decision

■ &king

When this process is repeated then. in the
ability is obtained.

Thia is what

Proposition 7 says; parallel intuition underlies Proposition 8.
Note that these propositions are independent of any a11U111ption1
concerning the nature of the errors in judgment which are made; all that
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is required is that each individual have some discriminating ability,
no matter how small; that is,

p

1

> p2

•

Another important point to be

noted here is that increasing the n1111ber of individuals in an
organization, in itself, does not yield perfect screening.
it la trivial to show that adding

■ore

For instance,

levels to a hierarchy, beyond soae

point, actually lowers the organization'•

perfor■ance;

this ia true even

if the evaluation coats were zero.
Of course, we do not see perfect screening; nor would we expect to
aee it in eoonoaic organizations.

The reason ia obvious:

there are costs

auociated with evaluation, and perfect screening requires auch large
amounts of re1ouroe1 to be spent on evaluation that it ia economically
undeairable. 17 That ia precisely why we have emphasized evaluation
coats in our analysis.

The presence of evaluation coats

■eans

not only

that all organizations are fallible in their decisions (like the
individuals of which they are composed) but also that (even taking, u we
have done here, the individuals' errors as exogenous) the level and the
nature of organizational errors are endogenous consequences of how the
decision

■aking

ia organized.

V.

CONCLUDING REJIAllS

Thia paper has analyzed the optimal structure of

com■ itteea,

hierarchies, and polyarchiea, under aome stylized assumptions.

Some of

these assumptions aay easily be dropped; others would require
substantial modifications to the analysis.

First, we have ignored the

coats and benefits of intra-organizational communication. 18

One of the

well observed facts of large committees, for instance, is that each
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iadividual atteapts to express his view.
that they have

infor■ ation

Individuals evidently believe

which ia not adequately 1UJU1arized by their

yea-no vote. and that this inforaation

alter the beliefs (aad hence

■ay

Such COJIIIIUJlication has

the votes) of other individuals in the committees.
It requires

several effects.
llllita of

ti■e

to co1111111nioate.

ti■ e

oo■■ullicate

for one individual to

If it takes

~

infor■ ation.

and if an

his

iadividual coall'IUlioates shrultaneously to the entire oo-ittee. than
•~

11J1it1 of

ti■e

are used by an

ae ■ber

n

oo-ittee.

other hand. oomnioationa are bilateral. then the
a(n -

1)~ •

which rises

■nch ■ore

Also. the benefits of
increasesi it is

by the

■ore

infor■ ation

be obtained

fro■

ti■e

If. on the
taken is

rapidly with the co-ittee size.

co■IIUJlioation ■ay di■lniah

likely that an individual's

that others have.

aa the co-ittee size

infor■ ation

The increase in the

is spanned

infor■ ation

to

colllllUlication. therefore. would be less than

proportionate as the oo-ittee size increases.
error in 001111UDication:

A related aspect is the

individuals can never co111DUDicate fully their

inforaation. and the information received

■ ay

be quite different

fro■

the

one which was intended by the person 001111D11Dicatina it.
Second. we have abstracted from important i11ue1 related to
incentives.

■ any

of which have been treated extensively elsewhere.

aspect to which we should call attention. however. is that a

A key

■anager'a

decision to pass on a project to a higher level for a review imposes coats
on the organization:

■oat

organizations do not charge the lower level

managers directly for these costs: designing incentive structures and

organizational rules which serve to internalize these externalities is a
question we hope to pursue elsewhere.
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Third. we have assumed that individuals are homogeneous in their
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decision ••king abilities.
rules, they aake

■ore

Since co-ittees involve symaetric decision

sense when in fact individuals are hoaogeneous.

Hierarchies, polyarchies and coaple% organizations. on the other hand,

■ay

have advantages over oo-ittees (in aaeliorating individuals' errors) when
different individuals have different abilities; that is, when they aake
different types of errors with different frequencies.
individuals, the

proble■s

Yith heterogeneous

of self-perpetuating organizations -

like

boards of directors of fo11Ddations and tenured faculties at universities
-

who choose their successors

beco■e

illportant.

Clearly, then. different

types of organizations give rise to different probability distributions of
abilities aaong the next generation's aeabers and. thus, to different
stochastic processes of ability distribution over

ti■ e.

In our 1985b

paper, we have analyzed this problem of self-perpetuating organizations.
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APPENDIX I

(a)

Substituting (1) into (S). it can be verified that

positive nllllbers.

The last expre11ion can be rearranged to yield

(28)

If Y(k) 2. Y(k -

(29)

If Y(k) 2. Y(k + 1) •

1) •

1)

> Y(k

-

then Y(k + 1)

> Y(k

+ 2) •

then Y(k -

The above expre11ioas imply that
oan be seen aa follows.
Y(k • 0)

> Y(k > 1)

and

•

Y(k • n) 2. Y(k • n - 1) ,
and

k • n

ia optimal.

> Y(k

Y(k • n - 1)
that

inequality.

ia optiaal.

then, froa (28).
If

• n) ,

Y(k) 2. Y(k - 1)

k • 0

and

Y(k

c

1)

and

Y !!. single peaked in k.

Y(k • 0) 2. Y(k • 1) •

If

2) •

> Y(k

then, froa (29).

If

Y(k • n)
c

0) •

> Y(k < n

- 1) •

and

then there ia an interior optillUlll at
Y(k) 2. Y(k + 1) •

Thia

k •

with at least one strict

Using (1) and (5), the above three results can be restated aa

(6a), (6b), and (60), respectively.

(30)

rq

such

~

1 ,

if p2

S1

- P1 •

Next, rewrite (6c) as

2. (n - k

+ l)lnrq + (2k - n - 2)lnq.

Now, suppose (7a) is not true; that is,
Then, tho right hand aide of (31) is nonnegative, since
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rq

2

1

from (30), and

ln(a /a )
2 1

< 0.

2

(2k - n - 2)

0.

On the other hand,

Expression (31) is thus contradicted.

Using a parallel

arguaont, it can be established ~hat (31) is contradicted if (7b) ia not
true.

Expression (7c) is aiaply a special cue of (7a) and (7b).

It

provides a sufficient condition for the aajority rule to be optimal

(32)

If

n

la an odd nuaber, then tho aajority rule implies:

If

n

is an oven nuabor, then tho two candidates for the aajority rule

are

k • n/2,

and

k • n/2 + 1.

k • (n + 1)/2 •

It is easily verified that both of

those solutions yield the aaao profit.
(c)

Expreaaion (22) yields

(33)

and

where

and

note that

ln(·)

(35)

1

are positive nllllbera, and

2

w • lnp /ln p
1
2

is strictly concave in its argument.

> 0.

Next,

Thus,

f3w - 12lnf3w21 - 1/f3w.

Substitution of the left part of the above inequality into (33) yields
if

1 )

f3 •

Similarly, substitution of the right part of the
p

inequality (35) into (34) yields
(d) Let
in an

(m, n)

h1 (a, n, p)

an
ap2

>O

if

p ) 1 •

denote the probability of a project's acceptance

polyarchy-hierarchy.

Then

b1 (m, n, p) = 1 - (1 - pn)m,
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1
hp ) 0 •
h1 (a, n,

h1 (p )
2

< p2 ;

and

h1
n

and hence the

< 0.

(a, n)

Now, choose

and

a

n

such that

polyarchy-hierarchy ha• lower

Type-I a• well a1 lower Type-II errors than a single individual.
treat the above
oon1truct an

(a, n)

(a, n)

Next,

polyarchy-hierarchy a1 a single 1ubuit, and

polyarohy-hierarohy consisting of such 1ubunit1.

If

the Tariable1 corresponding to the latter organization are denoted by the
111per1cript 2; that is, h2 -= 1 - (1 - (h1 )n)a ; then

2
h (pl)

> h1 (pl) > P1

•

and

2
h (p )
2

< h1 (p2 ) < p2

types of errors are reduced eTen further.

•

Thus, the two

If this proce11 i1 iterated

then, in the limit, perfect screening of projects is aohieTed.
reasoning underlie• Proposition 8.

Si ■ ilar

In fact, its proof ia identical to

that of Koore-Shaanon theorem in reliability literature [see Harrison
(1965, pp. 255-262), for exU1ple].

29

FOOl'NOTES

1.

There i1 a ro1ollblanoo between this characterizatio n and 1oae of the
problea1 studied in the reliability theoryJ a fallible manager
evaluating a portfolio containing two types of projects can be viewed
a1 a relay network'• ooaponent subject to two kinda of failures.

However. the ro1ult1 obtained here are. to our knowledge. not
available in the reliability literature.
2.

Thia simple representation of the project portfolio allows u1 to focus
sharply on the questions outlined earlier.

A aore general portfolio,

oon1i1ting of a oontinuua of projects, a1 well a1 tho po11ibility that
tho portfolio aay itself be affected by the' oo-ittee'1 structure (for
ezaaple. d•e to the effect of oo-ittee'1 decisions on the incentives
of project inventors) can be aodelled along the lines of Sah and
Stiglitz (1984).
3.

Thia can be derived as follows.

The probability that a coamittee

aooepts a project. given that one of its aelllber1 has accepted the
project i1
j _t

h(k - 1. n - 1) •

Tho probability that a co-ittee

accepts a project~_ ;-given that one of its aeuor1 has rejected the

project i1

h(k. n - 1) •

Clearly. then,

h(k, n) = ph(k - 1, n - 1) + (1 - p)h(k, n - 1) •

This expression, in

combination with (2), can be rearranged to yield (3).
4.

Specifically,
from (1).

ah/ap = (:)kpk-l(l - p)n-k

> 0.

which can be obtained
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S.

Note here that. since
(or saaller) than

1 - p

aagnitudea of

and

pl) 1/2 •
then.

6.

p

pl

> p2

1

•

p

2

ia greater

iaply certain restrictions on the

1

Spec if ic ally.

P2 •

whereas ·p2 .i 1 - P1

p 2 - 1 - p1

conditions such that

aeans that

P2 L 1 - P1

aeana that

< 1/2

p2

•

aeans that

Naturally

pl ) 1/2 ) P2 •

All subscripts. other than 1. 2 and

i •

denote the variables with

respect to which a partial derivative is being taken.
7.

A siaple derivation of (13) ia as follows.
. reexpre11ed as

Yk • a h k[(h kth k) - (a ta )] • 0 which. upon
1 2
2
1
2 1

differentiation . yields

Yll

then used to obtain (13).
and

9.

8Yk/ap1 •

Expression (11) can be

a

s

.

a1 h2 k ak(~k/h2k) •

Expression (9) ia

The saae aethod is helpful in deriving

which are needed below.

Another way to expre11 this result ia the following.
a

0

• dlnk/dlnn

2

= 1 - p

1

•

Let

denote the elasticity of the optimal consensus with

respect to the co-ittee size.
p

Ykn

Then:

skn

~

1

In addition. the lower bound on

by noting from (14) that

f - ½; > 0.

Thus.

if
1

0

s0

a1

~

a2 •

and

can be identified

> 1/2

•

regardle11 of the relative aagnitudea of the two types of individuals'

errors.

That ia:

The elasticity of optimal consensus with respect to

the commi tt.ee size .!.! greater than ™.-half.
10. Since
11. Note. however. that when

p

1

approaches unity. one would be

indifferent aaong the decision rules (including the majority rule)
since a perfect selection of projects is possible.
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12. To ascertain this. denote the nuaber of evaluations per project by
Then av/ap • (1 + (n - -n - l)p n 1/(1 - p) 2 •
p

Let

denote the nuaerator in the last expression.
if

its lowest value at
p

<1

and

•

course.

v

n

> 1.

p • 1.

where

n)

1 •

v • 0.
1

Then.
attains

Thus.

Hence

In the case of a single bureau

av/ap

>0

(n

1) •

a

if
of

ia independent of p.

13. It ia easily verified that the second order coadition is satisfied at
the optillllllll.

14. That h.

!L
ap

<0

i

15. If

n

H

•

fro ■

(22).

Hence

:; ::i

< 0.

is sufficiently large then. in fact. it is desirable to break

up a large hierarchy into
aentioned above.

un

than two parts. under the conditions

Also. it is easy to verify a parallel result that:

Reorganization of a large polyarchy into two or aore polyarchic
1ubUDit1 within a hierarchy yields a larger profit. if the portfolio
quality la not too high and. once again. if the evaluation costs
depend only on the number of managers.
16~ These propositions can be easily extended to a project portfolio

<.'- '-containing
1

a continuum of projects.

17. The concept of 'first best' (that is. of perfect decision making) is.
thus, not very useful in the present context.
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18. Soae aspect of co11111U1ication have been examined by ~levorick,
Rothschild and Winship (1984) in the context of jury decision
where they compare aajority rule without

co-■unication

■ &king,

to the oaae

where the observation s of different individuals are agareaated using
specific aggregation processes.
19. For additional remarks on the relationship between incentives and
organizatio n, see our 1984 paper.

Also, we have abstracted in this

paper fro• the coats ud benefits of acquiring and processing
infor■ ation.

There are, however, 1oae simple statistical aodela for

which the analysis presented here can be viewed aa Bayesian.
example of an explicit Bayesian fraaework, see our 1984 paper.

For an
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